

Susanne Mueller-Redwood

CONTACT INFORMATION	University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Political Science 110 North Hall, 1050 Bascom Mall Madison, WI 53706	Phone: +1 (312)-863-1598 E-mail: mueller6@wisc.edu www.susannemredwood.com
EDUCATION	UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, Madison, WI, USA Ph.D., Political Science Fields of Study: International Relations, Comparative Politics, Political Methodology (minor) M.A., Political Science THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago, IL, USA M.A., International Relations (with Honors) THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, Toronto, ON, Canada M.A. in Philosophy KING'S COLLEGE LONDON, London, UK B.A. in Philosophy	expected 2019 2012 2010 2006 2005
DISSERTATION	<i>The Domestic Sources of Autocratic Trade Agreements</i> Committee: Jon Pevehouse (Chair), Mark Copelovitch, Lisa Martin, Jessica Weeks As trade agreements have proliferated in recent years, autocracies are increasingly joining these agreements, casting doubt on two pieces of common wisdom in the field of IR: that dictators prefer to remain economically isolated and that democracies are most likely to enter into trade agreements. Yet existing scholarship rarely analyzes the link between domestic political dynamics in authoritarian states and international economic institutions. My research bridges this theoretical gap. Using both large-N statistical analysis and case studies, I show that autocrats are highly strategic in their choice of trade commitments and prefer different patterns and rules of trade cooperation than their democratic counterparts. My key argument is that the domestic factors that affect entry into trade agreements and the depth of integration work in opposite directions. I find that autocracies' increasing participation in trade agreements is largely driven by highly personalized autocracies, which prefer to enter into "shallow" agreements that do not require extensive trade integration. In contrast, autocracies with low levels of personalism often face significant domestic opposition to trade agreements, resulting in delayed or absent trade integration. When non-personalized autocracies manage to overcome these domestic obstacles, however, they tend to make deeper, more extensive trade commitments than other types of autocracy.	
RESEARCH INTERESTS	International political economy, international organizations, trade, domestic politics of IR, authoritarianism, democratization, state-business relations.	

WORKING PAPERS	<p>“Personalism and the Politics of Central Bank Independence under Authoritarianism” (under review)</p> <p>“Autocratic Central Banks and Monetary Policy Credibility” (in progress, last presented at ISA 2017)</p> <p>“Joining the Global Trade Regime: The Determinants of Autocratic Trade Agreements” (in progress)</p> <p>“International Trade Governance”, with Jon Pevehouse. Working Paper. Future chapter in Barnett, Michael, Jon Pevehouse, and Kai Raustiala (eds.), <i>The Future of Global Governance</i> (in progress, early stages)</p>	
ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS	<p>“<i>Joining the Global Trade Regime: The Determinants of Autocratic Trade Agreements</i>”</p> <p>Upper Midwest International Relations Conference, Madison, WI May 2018</p> <p>International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA April 2018</p> <p>International Political Economy Society Annual Meeting, Austin, TX November 2017</p> <p>American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA August 2017</p> <p>Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago April 2017</p> <p>“<i>Autocratic Central Banks and Monetary Policy Autonomy</i>”</p> <p>International Studies Association Annual Conference, Baltimore, MD February 2017</p> <p>“<i>Why Dictators Trade: Domestic Origins of Autocratic Trade Agreements</i>”</p> <p>American Political Science Association (Poster Presentation), Boston, MA September 2018</p> <p>Wisconsin International Relations Colloquium, Madison, WI November 2017</p> <p>International Studies Association Annual Conference, Junior Scholars Symposium, Baltimore, MD February 2017</p> <p>Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL April 2016</p> <p>“<i>Developing a Theory of Autocratic Economic Cooperation</i>”</p> <p>Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Junior Scholars Symposium, Chicago, IL April 2015</p> <p>Journeys in World Politics, Iowa City, IA March 2015</p> <p>Wisconsin International Relations Colloquium, Madison, WI December 2014</p>	
SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS	<p>Travel Grant, International Studies Association 2017–2018</p> <p>Institute for Humane Studies Fellowship 2016–2017</p> <p>Fred Ogg Fellowship, University of Wisconsin-Madison 2011–2012</p>	

Unendowed Scholarship, University of Chicago	2008–2010
Unendowed Scholarship, University of Toronto	2005–2006
German National Merit Foundation Scholar (“Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes”)	2002–2006
Graduated with honors, CIR Program, The University of Chicago	2010

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, Madison, WI, USA

Lecturer:

Analysis of International Relations (Game Theory, PS 348)	Spring–Fall 2018
Analysis of International Relations (online, PS 348)	Summer 2018

Teaching Assistant:

Analysis of International Relations (PS 376)	Spring–Fall 2017
Political Choice and Strategy (PS 274)	Fall 2016
International Political Economy (Online Graduate, PS 702)	Spring 2014
Introduction to International Relations (PS 103)	Fall 2013

Guest Lecturer:

Global Environmental Cooperation, Analysis of IR	April 3, 2017
Extensive-Form Games, Political Choice and Strategy	Nov. 14, 2016

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, Toronto, ON, Canada

Teaching Assistant:

Philosophy of Education	Spring 2006
Political Philosophy	Fall 2005

RESEARCH
EXPERIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, Madison, WI, USA

*Research Assistant, Professor Jon Pevehouse &
Editorial Assistant for International Organization* 2014–2015

- Constructed an online data archive for the journal. Edited manuscripts and replicated empirical findings. Assisted with website editing and organizational tasks.

Research Assistant, Professor Nadav Shelef 2012–2013

- Collected data and conducted empirical analysis on territorial divisions and homeland claims.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, Washington, DC, USA

Research Assistant to David Rothkopf 2010–2011

- Wrote background research papers for *Power, Inc.*, a book project in the *US Role in the World* Program, helped organize Economic Roundtable series.

GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, Berlin, Germany

Research Assistant 2008

- Contributed to study evaluating the World Bank's performance-based allocation system through background research, conducting interviews and analyzing country cases.

BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, Duesseldorf, Germany

Visiting Associate 2007

- Performed market research and analysis for communications industry project. Drafted governmental compliance reports and developed an integrated IT system for client in energy industry.

SERVICE

University of Wisconsin-Madison:

Mentor, Undergraduate Research Scholars Program 2013-2015

Discussant, International Relations Colloquium 2013-2018

Course development: designed and implemented new online game theory class (PS 348) Summer 2018

Reviewer:

European Political Science Review

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

American Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, International Studies Association, European Political Science Association

SKILLS

Languages:

German (native), French (intermediate), Italian (basic), Latin (intermediate reading)

Software:

Stata, R, L^AT_EX, TikZ, MATLAB, WordPress

CITIZENSHIP

German citizen, U.S. Legal Permanent Resident

REFERENCES

Jon C.W. Pevehouse, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, e-mail: pevehous@polisci.wisc.edu; phone: +1-(608)-262-4839

Mark Copelovitch, Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison, e-mail: copelovitch@wisc.edu; phone: +1-(608)-265-3678

Jessica L.P. Weeks, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, e-mail: jweeks@wisc.edu; phone: +1-(608)-263-2390